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ABSTRACT
This paper addresses the notion of dialectics in the linguistic bodies theory. First, it presents 
it as a three-aspect concept, namely, the ontological aspect, the methodological aspect, 
and the dialectical model. Subsequently, it discusses the ontological aspect and the dialec-
tical model and, based on the enactivist linguistic notions of concreteness and abstraction, 
suggests that it can be conceived as a two-fold concept: methodological and epistemolog-
ical. This suggestion intends to avoid the paradox we are led to by acknowledging three 
ontological enactivist claims and a few assumptions of the methodological approach.
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RESUMO
Este artigo aborda a noção de dialética na teoria dos corpos linguísticos. Em primeiro lugar, 
apresenta-o como um conceito de três aspectos, a saber, o aspecto ontológico, o aspec-
to metodológico e o modelo dialético. Posteriormente, discute o aspecto ontológico e o 
modelo dialético e, a partir das noções enativistas linguísticas de concretude e abstração, 
sugere que o conceito de dialética pode ser concebido como um conceito duplo: metodo-
lógico e epistemológico. Essa sugestão pretende evitar o paradoxo a que somos levados 
pelo reconhecimento de três afirmações ontológicas enativistas e suposições da aborda-
gem metodológica.
Palavras-chave: Dialética, Enativismo, Linguagem, Epistemologia, Ontologia.
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Introduction
In order to provide a new enact ive-based approach to cog-
nition that deals with the categorical gap between lower-order 
and higher-order cognitive processes the authors of the book 
Linguistic Bodies: The Continuity Between Life and Language 
(2018, MIT Press) proposed a rich and intricate theory of cog-
nition aiming at dissolving the incompatibility between correc-
tion criteria and natural explanations. This theory provides a 
framework, or model, for the understanding of bodies, social 
pract ices, and language that frames cognition as a three-level 
domain, namely, the organic viability, the sensorimotor grasp, 
and the social interact ion, and shows several steps for the re-
alization of linguistic agency. The theory, which I call linguistic 
enact ivism, rests on a fundamental notion that cuts across the 
whole model: the concept of dialectics. This concept is under-
stood as a ‘unity of opposites’, instead of as the traditional con-
ception of dialectics involving a contradiction between oppo-
sites sides. I will explain this difference in section 2. As a unity 
of opposites, dialectics occurs in many, if not all, dimensions of 
the model and on the very domains that frame cognition. In 
other words, dialectic situations occur in the three levels of cog-
nition and among them, and in each step of the model towards 
the realization of linguistic agency, for each of those steps is the 
result of an interplay between tensions that logically anticipate 
them (Di Paolo; Cuffari; De Jaegher, 2018).2
The notion of dialectics is presented in different ways 
throughout the book, and, due to the fact that these differ-
ences are not explicitly pointed out, the reader might be con-
fused by them. I have identified three ways in which it can be 
understood and I classify them in this text as (1) methodolog-
ical, (2) ontological, and (3) a feature of the model. In section 
2.1, I address the author’s first understanding of dialectics as 
“a method of inquiry that moves thought from the abstract to 
the concrete” (LB, p. 112). This understanding charact erizes 
the first asp ect that I point at, the methodological one, for it 
is clearly a methodological claim. In section 2.2, I present my 
reading of the first general description of dialectics as “(...) 
the thinking of opposites and circularities, of relations and 
tendencies, together with their counter-tendencies, and of 
transformation and becoming” (LB, p. 107). At this point, the 
reader will grasp the concept as part of an ontological claim 
about the nature of cognitive systems, for, it refers to tensions 
that emerge from the systems: “Dialectical tensions, instead, 
originate within the system and the multiple relations that 
constitute it. Tensions emerge as the disharmony and con-
tradictions of the tendencies of operation or potentialities for 
change between different parts, norms, or functions” (LB, p. 
114). Thus, the reader can infer that dialectical tensions exist 
among opposite tendencies in the world itself.  
Later on, when the categories of the model are more sp e-
cifically explained, the reader faces the question of whether dia-
lectics encompasses also the very model, which is dialectical and 
“inseparable from the concrete relations we find in the human 
lifeworld” (LB, p. 138). Thus, in section 2.3, I present a third way 
the reader can understand the concept of dialectics, namely, as a 
feature of the model. This third asp ect illustrates the main chal-
lenge to which I point at, namely, when we say that the theoret-
ical model is inseparable from concrete relations we find in the 
human lifeworld, which reflects the persp ective put forward in 
the book - that we bring forth a world in the relations with our 
milieu (social environment) - we must acknowledge that every-
thing there is, is constituted by relations, there is no ontological 
claim deeper that that. If everything is relationally constituted, 
then, our conceptions and models can only be epistemological 
persp ectives, resulting from our relations with our milieu. There 
is no independent dialectical world that we can account for onto-
logically, since things are what they are (to us) only in relation to 
us, according to the way we relate to them, be these ways percep-
tual-conceptual relations, scientific investigations or any other. 
As we can see, the reader can identify three asp ects un-
der which one can understand dialectics: the supposed on-
tological asp ect, the methodological asp ect and the very di-
alectical model. In this paper, I will first unfold these asp ects 
and suggest that the authors don’t have to compromise with 
an ontology, but only with an epistemological claim that is 
consistent with their view of concreteness as a constant goal of 
considering elements as embedded within the totality of their 
relations. Thus, I will suggest that dialectics could be under-
stood as a two-fold concept according to its methodological 
asp ect and to its epistemological asp ect. 
Thus, I will suggest that dialectics should be understood 
as a two-fold concept according to its methodological asp ect 
and to its epistemological asp ect. This suggestion rests on a 
clear-cut distinction between ontology and epistemology 
which I understand as follows: ontological claims are, in a 
broad way, claims in the context of the study and est ablish-
ment of what there is - what exists - and of the features and 
relations of these things (Hofweber, 2020). Epistemological 
claims are, in contrast to that, claims in the context of the 
study of what we know about what there is. Thus, the central 
point of epistemological claims is our cognitive success, may 
it be in perceptual-conceptual situations, in scientific investi-
gations, theoretical frameworks, among others, given all the 
available evidence and the methods of investigation we have. 
To  achieve my aim of presenting the very notion of di-
alectics and suggesting it could be understood as a two-fold 
concept: methodological and epistemological, I will first in-
troduce the enact ivist linguistic theory, subsequently present 
the three asp ects under which one can understand the notion 
of dialectics and finally suggest the reason why it could be un-
derstood as a two-fold concept: it avoids the paradox of the 
enact ivist dialectics, which we are led to when we acknowl-
edge three ontological enact ivist claims and a few assump-
tions of the methodological approach.
2 All references to the book will be made by the abbreviation ‘LB’.
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1. Linguistic Enactivism 
The theory of linguistic bodies proposes that we conceive 
bodies (our bodies) as three-domain entities. These domains 
can be named as (1) the biological, or organic, body, (2) the 
sensorimotor body and (3) the interact ive, or intersubjective, 
body. The organic dimension of the body is charact erized by 
“anatomical structures or physiology, or as bundles of sensors, 
effectors, and neuromuscular tissues” (LB, p. 24), physicochem-
ical processes of the organism, metabolic, immunological pro-
cesses etc., and precarious processes of self-individuation and 
adaptive engagement (coupling) with the environment. These 
structures and processes can be, and in general are, explained 
by investigations in the natural sciences. The sensorimotor di-
mension involves the processes of engagement (coupling) of 
the agent3 with the environment. These processes are not sep-
arated from neurobiological processes or from the relationships 
of organisms with other agents (LB, p.21). The intersubjective 
dimension is charact erized by the agent’s interact ion with oth-
er agents that relate to him/her not only as objects of contem-
plation, obstacle or use, but as powers of interpellation, which 
inquire him/her, ignore him/her, support him/her, respond to 
him/her, smile, cry, and share a world of act ivities and concerns 
with him/her (LB, p. 62).
The thesis presented in the book is that dialectical ten-
sions occur between the most diverse opposing trends. At the 
corporeal level, they occur between and within the body’s 
own dimensions, which are: organic, sensorimotor and in-
tersubjective. One example is the primordial tension of the 
autopoietic systems that occurs between the tendencies of 
self-production and self-distinction: “The primordial ten-
sion between an organism’s distinctiveness and its opening 
to the world is inherent in living bodies” (LB, p. 41). Let me 
briefly explain that: every living organism is an autopoietic 
system. Autopoietic systems are autonomous, in the sense 
that they self-regulate, but they are not independent, for they 
need means for self-production. Autopoietic systems can be 
defined as networks of “biochemical processes organized in 
such a way that the operation of these processes” (LB, p. 329) 
support the organism and its relations with the environment. 
These processes involve the system’s self-distinction in rela-
tion to the environment, as well as the system’s self-produc-
tion from the environment. Self-production is the process by 
which the system uses matter and energy, from the environ-
ment, for its own self-organization; and self-distinction is the 
process of rejecting the matter and energy from the environ-
ment. Self-production and self-distinction interact dialecti-
cally. This means that the organism adaptively regulates its 
coupling with the world selecting what it accepts and what it 
rejects from the world.  
Dialectical tensions - and their overcoming by means 
of transformations and mutual influences - constitute the 
normativity of a certain domain, which interacts with the 
normativity of other domains, ultimately resulting in the be-
havior of organisms that we observe in interact ive encounters, 
when we consider human interact ion, for example. In other 
words, from the primordial tension between self-distinction 
and self-production we can conceive dialectical pairs of oppo-
site tendencies not only in sp ecific domains of a body, but also 
among the domains and among bodies. For example, there 
can be a tendency of a biological need in the organic level, 
but a countertendency of a sensorimotor challenge on the 
sensorimotor level, or even on the intersubjective level - let 
us say one must use the toilet but the door of the only toilet 
available is locked, i.e. the conditions of the environment pre-
vent the navigation of the organism to the toilet bowl. This 
is a tension between the organic and the sensorimotor levels. 
Now let us assume that the overcoming of this tension is given 
by the solution of peeing on the grass outside the house, this 
could provoke a tension between the organic and intersubjec-
tive levels, since many humans are conditioned not to pee in 
public. As we can observe, the very conception of dialectics 
- as constant tensions that originate between multiple rela-
tions that constitute a system - is a key element of the theory, 
for it identifies the very source of normativity. These tensions 
are due to the disharmony and contradictions of operating 
trends between different parts, norms or functions of the sys-
tem (LB, p. 114).
Thus, we have individual normativity followed by inter-
act ive normativity, which is the idea that in social encounters, 
two or more organic systems co-regulate, for the interplay of 
their own sensorimotor normativities constitutes a dialectic 
tension. The interact ions of the organism with the world and 
with others promote sense-making, which is defined as “The 
act ive adaptive engagement of an autonomous system with its 
environment in terms of the differential virtual implications 
for its ongoing form of life. The basic, most general form of all 
cognitive and affective act ivity manifest ed experientially as a 
structure of caring” (LB, p. 332). As sense-making can be done 
jointly and it is affected by coordination patterns, breakdowns 
and recoveries undergone during social encounters, participa-
tory sense-making comes into play. Participatory sense-making 
is, then, “(…) the coordination of intentional act ivity in inter-
act ion, whereby individual sense-making processes are affected 
and new domains of social sense-making can be generated that 
were not available to each individual on her own” (LB, p. 73). 
Sense-making and participatory sense-making are the concep-
tual foundation of our linguistic capacities.
From participatory sense-making and the interplay 
between individual and interact ive normativity, the authors 
3 See Barandian; Di Paolo; Rohde (2009) for a definition of agency.
4 The theory of linguistic bodies, as a whole, aims to show “the logic of the activity of using language” (LB, p. 133). What I call ‘dialectical 
model of cognition’ is defined as a theoretical model that explains the “conceptual emergence of linguistic bodies out of participatory 
sense-making” (LB, p. 254). This model of how participatory sense-making leads to linguistic bodies is part of the theory. 
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present the dialectical model of cognition4, which encompass-
es dialectical tensions that operate from biological (organic) 
to social (interact ive) levels and it builds up through seven 
other dialectic steps leading us to the notion of linguistic 
agency. Each step “breaks into its main form of tension” (LB, 
p. 160) and generates, or leads to, the next step. To illustrate, 
I will briefly explain the first step of the model: participatory 
sense-making. Participatory sense-making breaks into indi-
vidual norms and interact ive norms. As I mentioned before, 
individual norms are constituted by the essential tensions be-
tween self-production and self-distinction among the three 
dimensions of embodiment.5 Each interact ive situation has 
its own interact ive norms, which are constituted by the com-
bination of the individual normativities. In pract ical terms, a 
good example for this autonomous normativity of interact ive 
situations is the narrow corridor case: subject A wants to walk 
through a narrow corridor towards the exit of the building 
while subject B is coming on the opposite direction, both peo-
ple want to pass by each other, but they bump into each other 
a few times before being able to pass by, because the corridor 
is narrow and the space is restricted. Both agents, together, 
self-regulate their act ions, despite the fact that they are not 
explicitly intentionally coordinating6 their act ions at first (LB, 
p.142), otherwise they wouldn’t bump into each other. This 
example illustrates how the combinations of opposite tenden-
cies offered by the individual’s own normativities and the con-
straints of the scene is transformed in the dialectical relation. 
2. The concept of dialectics
In philosophy, dialectics is traditionally understood as 
a method of argumentation that involves two opposite sides 
and a contradiction between them. “(...) Plato, for instance, 
presented his philosophical argument as a back-and-forth di-
alogue or debate, generally between the charact er of Socrates, 
on one side, and some person or group of people to whom 
Socrates was talking (his interlocutors), on the other” (May-
bee, 2018, para. 1). Linguistic enact ivism, in contrast to that, 
relies on the notion of dialectics in Marxian and Engelian 
thought, which has its ultimate origin in Hegelian philosophy 
and takes the transcendence of dichotomies in favour of “a 
unity of opposites” (Loader, 2015).7
2.1. Dialectics as a method
The first asp ect the reader can identify in the book is the 
conception of dialectics as a method, which is strongly influ-
enced by the Hegelian view of systematic dialectics, for it is a 
way of thinking. As I mentioned before, dialectics is consid-
ered in the linguistic bodies theory as an “inquiry that moves 
thought from the abstract to the concrete” (LB, p. 112). For 
understanding their view, let us consider their conception of 
abstractness and concreteness. 
Concreteness is traditionally considered in the twen-
tieth century philosophy as a feature of a material object in 
contrast to abstractness. This distinction marks a line in the 
metaphysical debate about entities. There is no consensual 
account of what they are, but there are clear paradigmat-
ic cases that enable the distinction: “(...) [I]t is universally 
acknowledged that numbers and the other objects of pure 
mathematics are abstract (if they exist), whereas rocks and 
trees and human beings are concrete” (Rosen, 2020, para. 1). 
According to the authors of linguistic enact ivism, the phil-
osophical tradition maintains that “(...) the concrete is that 
which is closer to actual perceptions, to the fact icity of the 
real world, while the abstract is that which is more general, 
that which, removed from the senses, indicates commonal-
ities across actual instantiations” (LB, p. 111).  Indeed, it is 
acknowledged that the distinction between the mental and 
material realms have been a crucial factor in the development 
of distinction between abstract and concrete since Descartes 
(see Rosen, 2020).
Linguistic Enact ivism (LB, p. 112), in contrast to the tra-
ditional distinction presented above, conceives concreteness “as 
both material operations and epistemological attitudes”.  In this 
persp ective, abstractness is considered as “synonymous with 
isolation, decontextualization, or separation from a set of rela-
tions”. This understanding is also justified by the etymology of 
the word,  “ab+trahere ‘to pull or draw away from, to remove’” 
and it can be applied to both realms distinguished by cartesian 
views, either to the realm of ideas, or to the realm of material 
objects. Concreteness is then, “equally applicable to both ideas 
and objects and involves the opposite move of examining some-
thing by considering it increasingly embedded within a net-
work of relations”. In other words, the more something - either 
5 Keep in mind that we are talking about situated (embedded) bodies, which interact constantly with others and with the world. These 
processes don’t start from the individual. They are constantly developing and immersed in networks of relations. The theory is an at-
tempt to abstract and objectify parts of these processes which are constantly happening. As all abstraction and objectification, accord-
ing to the authors, it has its limitations, and it will always have. It is worth noting that the very concepts of abstraction and objectification 
have its own specific definitions in the book. I am using them here according to these definitions.
6 I would like to refer here to the important concepts of dissonance and synergy. Although I shall not go into the details here, these 
concepts are fundamental for explaining social interactions.
7 According to Loader (2015), we can distinguish Hegel’s dialectics into two different domains: one that is the very unfolding of events 
and one that has to do with a categorization of the world - despite the fact that sometimes the very categorization of the world is the 
logic of the unfolding of events. The first one has to do with transitions manifest in the activities of individuals, and their consciousness. 
The second one has to do with the categorical analysis characteristic of our understanding of material phenomena. In this categorization 
domain, the Hegelian dialectics is a way of thinking that avoids the process of understanding a phenomenon by considering its parts in 
isolation from other parts.
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an object or an idea - is considered in isolation from its network 
of relations, the more abstractly it is considered. An example 
of that is the scientific common pract ice of studying an object 
of study in the lab, in isolation from its natural surroundings. 
Take as an illustration the famous drug study conducted for the 
first time on rats living in a socially favourable environment.8
The study investigated the difference of morphine self-admin-
istration of rats in isolated standard laboratory cages and in a 
large open box that reproduced living social conditions of rats 
(Alexander et. al., 1978). This is a good example of an attempt 
to consider an object of study more concretely according to the 
definition of linguistic enact ivism. In line with this thought, 
there has been an increasing interest in the study of “cognition 
in the wild” (Hutchins, 1995), i.e., “to consider the complexities 
of everyday sociomaterial engagements, the experience of liv-
ing and interact ing in the real world, stepping outside the lab” 
(LB, p. 111)
As a method, dialectics is, then, a particular way of ap-
proaching something by attempting to consider the biggest 
number of possible forms of relations it is involved in, for it 
is a way of going towards the concrete relations. In this ac-
tivity of considering something in its concreteness, there is 
an “ongoing confrontation between patterns of thoughts and 
real situations” (LB, p. 112), for, due to the very nature of our 
epistemological condition we will constantly fail to consider 
something in its concrete totality. 
  Concreteness is, then, the never reaching aim of a 
dialectical method. For, it is the way things are, namely, essen-
tially related to uncountable other things, i.e in their network 
of relations, and it is an impossible task to understand things 
in their totality. Nevertheless, “Concreteness guides us into 
making appropriate interpretations of the terms of the defini-
tion, or amending those terms, eventually even rejecting them 
if necessary” (LB, p. 29). Formal or theoretical definitions, in 
this context, are the abstract counterpart of concrete total-
ities, they may be given by patterns of thoughts or linguistic 
expressions. Their main charact eristics is the fact that they 
are a partial way of cognitive living systems of interpreting, 
conceiving or perceiving, concrete totalities. In this context 
“(…) formal definitions [are used] as tools for thinking, not as 
ways of abstractly capturing once and for all the phenomena 
of interest” (LB, p. 29). Thus, the proposal of concreteness as 
a guide into appropriate interpretations is an alternative to 
considering formal definitions as ways of capturing once and 
for all phenomena. As an example, a definition of ‘recursion’ 
as a feature of language by means of which we refer to internal 
elements of a sentence9 is a theoretical definition that selects 
a notion as central at the cost of ignoring the networked rela-
tions it is involved in when it is working in its concrete totality 
(LB, p. 29).  
The methodological approach suggest ed in the book for 
avoiding the selection of central notions at the cost of ignor-
ing its relations is best described in this passage:
In practice, this means proceeding by a 
series of steps. First, a complex whole is 
presented, initially using a well-chosen 
starting point, an abstraction that cap-
tures something important about the 
actual whole. Second, since the abstract 
whole is not fully realized or totally de-
termined, its dialectical situation must be 
revealed through an analysis of tensions in 
potentialities and barriers, tendencies and 
countertendencies, and so on. Third, a 
passage toward a new dialectical situation 
is described by presenting the empirically 
known conditions and events that are able 
to realize the potentialities in the original 
situation. In general, these actualities will 
be historically contingent. The steps are 
then repeated, keeping to a minimalist 
spirit to avoid jumping stages, and de-
scribing the progressive concretization of 
the whole with as much detail as required 
(LB, p. 113).
The result of this methodological proposal is the con-
cretization of concepts, i.e. of notions selected and developed 
from concrete totalities. This concretization is illustrated by 
the concept of autopoiesis (autopoietic systems), which sub-
stitutes the formal definition of organism: the example of the 
primordial tension of autopoietic systems, i.e. “[(...) autopoie-
sis as opposite tendencies of self-production and self-distinc-
tion] is a less abstract understanding of the initial whole (a 
formal, set-theoretic notion of the organism turns into a situ-
ated, dynamic concept of lived act ivity). [Thus,] Concretized 
concepts are what the method yields” (LB, p. 114). 
Dialectics as a method can10, then, be considered as an 
epistemological tool 
(…) useful for tracking the changing rela-
tions between systems and the evolution of 
concepts themselves. Dialectics can set the 
stage for dynamical analysis, (...) can serve 
8 See the article “The effect of housing and gender on morphine self-administration in rats” by Alexander, B. K., Coambs, R. B., & Ha-
daway, P. F., published in 1978 in Pharmacology. This illustrative example is merely to explain the difference of considering an object 
abstractly or concretely according to the definition of linguistic enactivism. There are several studies both questioning and reinforcing 
the effects of rats drug consumption depending on environment enrichment. It is also worth pointing out that results of experiments 
may be influenced by the very settings of experiments, which consider objects of study in isolation of their natural environment.
9 This is a general definition for illustrative purposes. Recursion is a complex concept, often used in slightly different ways (see Corballis, 
2011).
10 There are several benefits of the method suggested by the authors. I will not explore them here.
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as a way of revealing the conceptual linkag-
es between elements, [and] (...) it can also 
serve for understanding how the tensions 
between elements change over time (LB, 
p.109).
This methodological asp ect of dialectics is in line with
the systematic domain in Hegel’s dialectic. For, it has to do 
with the categorical analysis charact eristic of our understand-
ing of material phenomena (Loader, 2015). In this categori-
zation domain, the Hegelian dialectics is a way of thinking 
that avoids the process of understanding a phenomenon by 
considering its parts in isolation from other parts. Dialectics is 
a way of thinking that seeks understanding by considering that 
“(…) things are what they are only in relation to other things 
and can only be adequately understood in their interconnect-
edness” (Loader, 2015, p. 83) in their change over time and in 
the superseding of dichotomies. 
This charact er of the methodological asp ect of dialectics is 
a key element for me to propose the view that dialectics should 
be understood as methodological and epistemological because 
it highlights that the method is a way of thinking that seeks un-
derstanding, which is in itself, an epistemological stance.
2.2. Dialectics as an ontology 
The ontological asp ect of dialectics can be identified in 
several passages of the book. It is identified by the underlying 
claim that the very nature of cognitive systems is dialectical 
and it is in line with the Hegelian domain of dialectics mani-
fest ed in the very unfolding of events:
Dialectical tensions, instead, originate with-
in the system and the multiple relations that 
constitute it. Tensions emerge as the dishar-
mony and contradictions of the tendencies 
of operation or potentialities for change be-
tween different parts, norms, or functions. 
When a passage out of a dialectical situa-
tion into another occurs, oppositions are 
transformed rather than equilibrated (LB, p. 
114).
Thus, the reader wonders that in the Linguistic Bod-
ies theory, dialectics should not be understood merely as 
a methodological aspect useful to comprehend cognitive 
systems. Dialectics is a mode of relation between oppos-
ing tendencies in nature. As it is exemplified by the afore-
mentioned tension between self-production and self-dis-
tinction in autopoietic systems and it is present on every 
co-dependent pair of opposite tendencies, i.e. “[t]he ten-
sion (...) is manifested at all levels with the result that liv-
ing systems are rendered intrinsically active, self-differen-
tiating, and restless” (LB, p. 41).
Based on Simondon (2016), the authors conceive dia-
lectical situations - indicating the ontological approach - as 
“(...) a tension between unrealized potentialities and barri-
ers to their realization. It is a metastable situation that may 
lead to a process of innovative resolution or individuation 
if met with appropriate material conditions and triggering 
events” (LB, p. 113). In this context, dialectics is a constant 
interact ion, or engagement, between tendencies where 
there is no equilibrium or golden mean,11 but the ongoing 
negotiation between tendencies, for they are codependent 
and frequently superseded and transformed. In other words, 
my understanding of the expression ‘met with material con-
ditions and triggering events’ is that these constant engage-
ments require and acquire different outcomes depending 
on several contingent conditions of the parts involved and 
on several contingent features of situations. This, let us call 
it, broad contingency, is given by the very lived situations an 
organism enacts and it is approached by the authors, in the 
domain of linguistic bodies interact ions, by the seventh step 
of the model: participation genres. 
For a textual reference to the reading I presented in the 
previous paragraph, I refer to two citations, where the authors 
explain the opposing tendencies of the sixth step of the dia-
lectical model - between utterance production and interpreta-
tion -, and where they refer to the superseding of dialectical 
situations, resp ectively. In these passages, they mention pre-
cisely the negotiative asp ect: the non-golden-mean outcome 
and the transformation: “The codependence and polarity 
between production and interpretation result in divergent 
tendencies. They demand an act ive negotiation among the 
participants. There is no context-free golden mean” (LB, p. 
178); and “When a passage out of a dialectical situation into 
another occurs, oppositions are transformed rather than 
equilibrated” (LB, p.114). As we can see, the authors consider 
that the very ever-present process of self-individuation en-
act ed by living organisms, “(…) is precisely the avoidance of 
full stability by ongoing renewal of metastable states rich in 
potentialities” (LB, p. 41).
The point is, then, that the notion of dialectics is clear-
ly intended also as part of an ontology of organisms, for, 
throughout the book and as I referred to in section one, the 
authors defend the claim that dialectical tensions are inher-
ent to living beings from the primordial tension between the 
organism’s opening and its distinctiveness of the world to the 
most sophisticated forms of social interact ions when it comes 
to the tension between production and interpretation in lin-
guistic understanding.
2.3. The dialectical model
The third asp ect that I highlight about the concept of di-
alectics is the charact erization of the theoretical model. The 
11 A golden mean is an intermediate state between two extremes where the precise middle, the equilibrium, is achieved.
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theory of linguistic bodies encompasses an eight-step theoret-
ical model that describes the “conceptual emergence of lin-
guistic bodies out of participatory sense-making” (LB, p. 254). 
The steps are: (1) Participatory sense-making, (2) Social acts, 
(3) Coordination of social acts, (4) Normativity of Social acts, 
(5) Community of interactors, (6) Dialogue and recognition, 
(7) Participation genres and (8) Reported utterances. As I 
mentioned before, each of these steps “breaks down into its 
main form of tension” (LB, p. 160) and generates, or leads to, 
the next step.
The reasons why the model is theoretical and dialec-
tical are, in my understanding, three. First, it is a theoret-
ical model because it is an elaboration of conceptual cate-
gories. In this sense, it is not a mathematical model, nor a 
computational model. Second, the steps of the model are 
divided into opposing tendencies - their main form of ten-
sion. This is the main reason why the model is considered 
dialectical, because it reproduces the tensions assumedly 
present in the phenomena it describes. Then, since dialec-
tics is a way of thinking (as we have seen in section 2.1) 
that allows us to get closer to the concrete, the third rea-
son why the model is dialectical is that it is understood 
as a more concrete approach than other conceptions of 
cognition. This understanding is due to its two main char-
acteristics, the aforementioned (1) consideration for the 
tensions in which the steps are divided into, which is taken 
to be a way of getting closer to the concrete; and (2) the 
consideration of the relations between the very steps of the 
model and the dimensions of embodiment. 
When the reader takes (1) and (2), namely, the ac-
counting for tensions and the accounting for relations, as fea-
tures which are proper of the concreteness of the model, she 
assumes that these methods (1 and 2) are ways of treating the 
object of study in question as immersed in its network of rela-
tions. And, as we can read on the text, the model is conceived 
as inseparable from concrete relations: 
The development of categories in the 
dialectical model is inseparable from the 
concrete relations we find in the human 
lifeworld. It is also inseparable from histo-
ry and from cognitive and social develop-
ment. These concrete relations and histor-
ical elements feed into the understanding 
of the transitions between the forms of 
social agency we analyze here (LB, p. 138).
As the model is considered as a development of catego-
ries, and as the authors indicate that the theory and the model 
should be corrected and complemented from its current ver-
sion, I take the model to be one possible framing of concrete 
relations. If this is correct, or, in other words, the model is one 
possible understanding of concrete relations, then, this is where 
we see how important is the epistemological charact er of dia-
lectics, for, the very theoretical model of cognition is composed 
of claims that reflect our understanding of how things are.
3. Final remarks: the ontology 
of linguistic enactivism 
The three conceptions of dialectics that I identified 
throughout the book and presented above can be synthesized 
as (1) method, (2) ontology and (3) model because (1) dia-
lectics is “a method of inquiry that moves thought from the 
abstract to the concrete” (LB, p. 112); (2) “Dialectical ten-
sions originate within the system and the multiple relations 
that constitute it” (LB, p. 114); and (3) dialectics is also “The 
development of categories in the dialectical model” (LB, p. 
138). These definitions indicate that the method is a way of 
analyzing and framing the concrete relations that originate in 
the systems that we want to understand; for the ontological 
asp ect is a way of accounting for the nature of things; and the 
model with its categories, together with the statement that it 
should be developed and corrected (LB, p. 133), indicates that 
it is one possible way of framing the concrete. 
After identifying these three asp ects of the concept of 
dialectics and analyzing them more carefully, I would like 
to propose a new understanding of it, as a twofold concept: 
methodological and epistemological. For this proposal, I start 
from that broad first understanding provided by the meth-
odological asp ect, namely, dialectics as a way of thinking that 
seeks understanding, given that things can only be understood 
in their interconnections and their change over time. As 
stated in the introduction, I take that epistemological claims 
are made in the context of what we know about what there 
is. This context is a context of relations; in other words, our 
ways of relating to the world we inhabit are ways in which 
we know it. As dialectics is a way of thinking that seeks un-
derstanding, or knowledge, it is, with no doubt, an epistemo-
logical enterprise. So, from the methodological asp ect we are 
easily led to the epistemological asp ect. But let us unfold this 
a little further before getting to the suggestion that we could 
avoid committing to the ontological stance of dialectics. 
There are three important ontological enact ivist 
claims and a few assumptions of the methodological ap-
proach that are important to my argument. The ontological 
enact ivist claims are: (1) Things are concrete - essentially 
related to other things, as we have seen in section 2.1; (2) 
Environment and organism are mutually constituted (Va-
rela; Thompson; Rosh, 2016); and (3) Things change over 
time. The assumptions of the methodological approach are 
indicated by the relevant passages (LB, p. 113) I mentioned 
in section 2.1, namely, that we must start the application of 
the dialectical method by considering “(...) an abstract ion 
that captures something important about the actual whole.” 
This starting point should, then, be considered as an ab-
stract whole which “(...) is not fully realized or totally deter-
mined (...).” Then, “(…) a passage toward a new dialectical 
situation is described by presenting the empirically known 
conditions and events (...) [and] in general, these actualities 
will be historically contingent” (LB, p. 113).
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In assuming that things are constantly changing and that 
every description is a partial description, as it is assumed by 
the dialectical methodological approach, we must concede 
that every theory is itself an epistemological enterprise; in 
other words, it is one way of framing concrete relations which 
we will never know, or understand, as a whole. This means 
that, in analyzing a situation dialectically or engendering in 
the methodological approach offered by linguistic enact ivism, 
one is not describing how things are in their totality, one is 
proposing an epistemological take, a persp ective - a partial de-
scription, by definition, which is observed in the dialectical 
model presented in section 2.3. Thus, we have the method-
ological and epistemological asp ects of dialectics. Let us now 
address the question of ontology.
The authors say that ontological questions are not re-
duced to epistemology, as we can read on section 6.2: 
(…) the whole system is set in motion and 
ontological questions are neither reduced 
to epistemology nor severed from it. As we 
have seen in the first part, significance is 
enacted by bodies in the world, which are 
also bodies of the world. But this is noth-
ing if not the dialectical transformation of 
a solid dichotomy into a fluid, dynamic, on-
going becoming of bodies in action. This 
is at the core of the original formulation of 
enactive ideas when it is said that enaction 
brings forth a world (Varela et al. 1991). In 
this sense, dialectics is, and has been since 
the start, one way of thinking enactively (LB, 
p. 111).  
Despite the fact that ontological questions are not re-
duced to epistemology, I believe that it is precisely for the fact 
that significance is enact ed by bodies which are also part of 
the world, that every significance is already an epistemolog-
ical persp ective, and dialectics is, as mentioned in this very 
quotation, a way of thinking, which brings us more under-
standing of the world and of ourselves. Let me unfold the 
statement that every significance is already an epistemolog-
ical persp ective: significance is enact ed by bodies according 
to their relations with the world, this means that it may be 
different according to the constitution of these bodies - for 
example, a tall body affords act ions that a short body doesn’t 
- and contingent on body constitutions, tools, scientific tools, 
historical relations with a certain situation and so on. Thus, 
every significance is constitutively dependent on an episte-
mological persp ective. 
Therefore, if we accept the primary ontological claim 
that things are concrete12, including our own interact ion with 
the world we live in, our conceptions and models can only 
be epistemological persp ectives, resulting from our relations 
with our milieu. There is no independent world that we can 
account for ontologically, since things are what they are (to 
us) only in relation to us, and according to the way we relate 
to them, be these ways scientific investigations or perceptu-
al-conceptual relations. 
This is our paradox in the enact ivist framework: for a 
claim to be ontological, it must be epistemological, for the 
world is constituted in the epistemic relations we have with 
our milieu. This means that, on every theory, when we try to 
offer an ontology, we are committed with an epistemological 
persp ective, by definition. My interlocutor may object to this 
by suggesting that I haven’t grasp ed the difference between 
ontology and epistemology and arguing that I am dissolving 
the ontological proposal by suggesting that there is no such 
thing as the study of what there is (ontology). I do not sug-
gest that. I do acknowledge that there are proper ontological 
claims in the enact ivist theories, and, more than that, I believe 
that the main ontological claim, namely, the claim that every-
thing is mutually constituted, prevents us of defending that 
the concept of dialectics can also be an ontological concept. 
This is so because dialectics must be our way of interact ing 
with the world, which is the way we make sense of the world 
(we know, understand, conceive and so on). 
Consequently, this is the paradox of the enact ivist dia-
lectics: dialectical tensions abstract ed by the model cannot be 
ontological if they depend on constant concretization given 
that concretization is an epistemic act ivity. That is, the dia-
lectical model has to be epistemic because it is built from the 
epistemic relationship. On the other hand, it may be that the 
authors say that the dialectical model is intended to explain 
the very nature of cognitive processes (and of all relations in 
the world - which are dialectical) so it is a claim about what 
they are, being, in this case, ontological. Then, we should ac-
cept that the model explains the dialectics that there is in the 
world. In this case, the dialectical model is ontological. But, 
once again, the dialectical model depends on the constant 
concretization, and in this sense, it will change according to 
the way we relate to the world.
Maybe, the best way to conceive this paradox is, in an 
admittedly circular manner, as a form of dialectical tension 
between ontology and epistemology. This would mean that 
we could consider the world as constantly changing and our 
relations to the world as constantly changing as well. But I 
will not explore this idea here. I will, for now, propose that the 
concept should be understood as twofold: as a methodologi-
cal proposal and as a feature of the model (epistemological) 
- which is the partial result of the ever-present investigations 
towards the concrete - as long as it keeps its main feature as 
an “(…) ongoing confrontation between patterns of thoughts 
and real situations” (LB, p. 112). This proposal avoids the 
aforementioned paradox by acknowledging other enact ivist 
ontological claims rather than the notion of dialectics. In this 
12 This ontological claim can be developed into a stronger ontological claim, namely, that everything there is are relations. Although I’m 
very sympathetic to this claim I will not unfold this view here.
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way, linguistic enact ivism can be free of this issue by conceiv-
ing dialectics as twofold. 
Dialectics can be defined, then, in an epistemological 
persp ective, as a co-developing pair: method and model. For 
they constantly feed from each other by the updates of the 
model given the very nature of the method as an ongoing 
process of confrontation between patterns of thoughts and 
real situations. Thus, given the very nature of the method of 
confronting patterns of thought with concrete relations pres-
ent in real situations, which are, by definition, dynamic and 
autonomous in their normativity, the model is not only in its 
current stage open to further applications, extensions, “scruti-
ny, criticism, and interpretive accommodations” (LB, p. 133), 
but it will remain always open to that; and it is the perennial 
task of philosophy to keep developing it. 
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